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I have for some time been puzzled about the status of narrative in the
law, and more particularly the status of talk about narrative in the law. On
the one hand, there has been plenty of legal scholarship-starting more or
less from the "storytelling" issue of Michigan Law Review in 1989-on
the uses (and the virtues) of "outsider" narratives in the law, and even
before that there was Robert Cover's foundational Nomos and Narrative.'
* University Professor, University of Virginia, and Director, Program in Law & Humanities. For
helpful critical responses to drafts of this essay, I wish to thank Barbara Fried, Thomas Grey, Richard
Ford, Robert Weisberg, and the students of the Stanford Legal Studies Workshop, as well as faculty
colleagues at Virginia Law School. My thanks also to Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks for her attentive
reading, to Melissa Heaton for her invaluable research assistance, and to Caroline Trowbridge for her
expert editing.
1. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); see also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
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It has become something of a commonplace-too much of one-that legal
storytelling has the virtue of presenting the lived experience of
marginalized groups or individuals in a way that traditional legal
reasoning doesn't. This view has of course been criticized, and some of
the more naive assumptions about the moral benefits of storytelling have
been questioned. On the other hand, I am not aware that all this story talk
has made any difference to legal actors. Trial advocates tell stories-they
have always told stories-and clinical training in advocacy includes some
attention to construction of the story you will tell in the courtroom2 (which
of course echoes the training in rhetoric given to lawyers in antiquity,
when rhetoric and the law were inextricably interwoven). In particular, it
is assumed that juries often decide verdicts on the basis of the more
persuasive story presented at trial.3
Yet you search in vain for any explicit recognition by legal decision-
makers that how a story is told can make a difference in legal outcomes.
That is not quite true: there are moments when the law notes that a story
has been mis-told, or not told according to the rules (of evidence, for
instance), or doesn't make sense as told. Appellate courts are to some
degree the enforcers of rule-governed storytelling. Yet they don't talk
narrative talk. They are conspicuously lacking in the analytic vocabulary
and tools of literary "narratology," for instance. Narratology-which I
shall discuss in more detail later on- distinguishes between events in the
world and the ways in which they are presented in narratives. It pays
attention to the parts of narrative and how they combine in a plot; to how
we understand the initiation and completion of an action; to standard
narrative sequences (stock stories, one might say); and to the movement of
a narrative through a state of disequilibrium to a final outcome that re-
establishes order. Narratology also studies perspectives of telling: who
sees and who tells, the explicit or implicit relation of the teller to what is
told, the varying temporal modalities between the told and its telling. I
know of only one instance when the Supreme Court shows an explicit,
quasi-narratological awareness of narrative as a category of thought and
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
2. See, e.g., STEFAN H. KRIEGER ET AL., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 137-48 (2d ed. 2003) (presenting
story model as one for organizing facts); STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND
PRACTICE (3rd ed. 2004); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 508 (6th ed. 2002) (describing
developing the theory of the case as an "ongoing process of developing logical, consistent positions on
disputed facts and integrating them harmoniously with the undisputed facts to create a persuasive story
of what really happened"); Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love 111": Rethinking Closing Arguments
as Stories, 50 S.C. L. REV. 715 (1999); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Sunwolf, Talking Story in Trial: the Power
of Narrative Persuasion, 24 THE CHAMPION 8, 26-31 (2000).
3. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDOzo L. REV. 519 (1991).
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presentation of reality (I'll come back to it later), and it has not produced a
sequel. My question, then, is something like this: if the ways stories are
told, and are judged to be told, makes a difference in the law, why doesn't
the law pay more attention to narratives, to narrative analysis and even
narrative theory? These would seem to be almost as relevant as economic
or social theory to understanding how cases come to the law and are
settled by the law. Whereas a number of disciplines that border on the
law-history, sociology, philosophy, even economics-have within the
past couple of decades recognized a "narrative turn" in their work,4 there
does not seem to have been an analogous recognition in legal adjudication.
The narrative turn (a synonym would be: trope) has been made applicable
to the law by such scholars as Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner,
who maintain that in the law as in other domains, "much of human reality
and its 'facts' are not merely recounted by narrative but constituted by it." 5
Yes, but does the law know this? If it does, what kind of a knowing is it?
Why can't it be more explicit about the knowledge?
I want to pursue this question by way of a few concrete examples
before reaching a more general discussion of narratology and its possible
place in the law, in the belief that the pertinence of the kind of questions
addressed in narrative analysis will in this manner become more evident.
Like many literary critics, I prefer working from problems posed by texts
toward the more general issues these may implicate. Before coming to my
cases, let me set the stage by way of two representative discussions of the
place of narrative in legal process. In Robert P. Bums's A Theory of the
Trial, for one instance, the term "narrative" appears to be the key to the
author's understanding of how a trial works. For Bums, the trial is "the
crucible of democracy" because jurors use their latent cognitive narrative
abilities to arrive, most often, at the correct verdict.6 If you turn to his
index, you will find a series of subheads under narrative, for instance:
"cognitive significance of'; "competing narratives"; "constraints on";
"jury evaluation of"; "moral meaning of"; "public identity and"; "relation
of to folk psychology"; "role of in trial"; "role of jury in constructing";
"structure of"; "use of in opening statements"; "use of in structuring direct
examination."7 This seems promising. But in practice-in the way Bums
conducts his analysis-we rarely get beyond the identification of
4. See, e.g., JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
(2004); CARLO GINZBURG, CLUES, MYTHS, AND THE HISTORICAL METHOD (1990); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, IF YOU'RE SO SMART: THE
NARRATIVE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE (1990).
5. ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 111 (2000); see also GUYORA
BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 201-91 (2000).
6. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 201 (1999).
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something as narrative. Then we make a leap to its moral import. It's as if
Bums had accepted Hayden White's provocative but surely too simplistic
argument that narrative is in essence a moralization of events as the last
and only word on the subject.8 Bums apparently feels no need to ask
himself what narrative is, how it works, what its parts might be, and how
they might go together-in short, the kind of questions that narratology
would ask.
At what I regard as a key moment in his argument, Bums notes that
"[i]nvestigators in many fields... have concluded that narrative forms the
deep structure of human action. In other words, the bedrock of human
events is not a mere sequence upon which narrative is imposed but a
configured sequence that has a narrative character all the way down."9
And a few pages later: "Failure to understand how fundamental narrative
is to the comprehension of human action and human selves has led to
similar elevation of what we may call analytic-logical categories in the
philosophy of history and in the understanding of the trial."'" Sentiments
to which I subscribe, of course. In the legal sphere, Bums appears to be
making a critique similar to that urged by Jerome Bruner in his essay, The
Narrative Construction of Reality, where he argues that cognitive
psychologists have traditionally focused too much on the "little scientist"
view of child development, not enough on the constructive narrative
component of the cognitive toolkit." But then comes a kind of swerve in
Bums' argument, into moral philosophy, eventuating in the claim that the
"natural superiority of the true story would provide a condition of the
possibility of the truth of verdicts."' 2 It's not so much that I find this
conclusion disturbingly complicit with the legal ideologies I thought
Bums had set out to critique, but that it seems to negate all that we thought
he was discovering about the power of and potential of narratives-
including the power to mislead, even to mis-convict. What if instead of
turning to the moral philosophers he had read a bit of narratology-by
which I mean such critics and theorists as the Russian Formalists, or the
French Structuralists, perhaps especially Roland Barthes, Tzvetan
Todorov, and Gerard Genette? 13 Narratology has provided some elements
of an analytic that would enable one to go beyond arguing the inevitable
goodness of the true narrative.
Richard A. Posner (in my second instance) grants that story is "an
important element in law" and suggests that "literary theory" might be a
8. See Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON
NARRATIVE I (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981).
9. BURNS, supra note 6, at 222.
10. Id.at225-26.
11. Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 4 (1991).
12. BURNS, supra note 6, at 229.
13. For some representative samples of this work, see infra note 105.
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place to seek elucidation of it, yet finds that "much of the best scholarship
on the story element in law owes little to ... fields outside of law itself."' 4
While he (justifiably, I think) criticizes the volume Law's Stories for not
containing enough consideration of "the methodological issue-by what
means is one to study the story element in law?"15 he glosses over the
pieces that do argue essentially narratological points (Alan Dershowitz's
and my own introduction). 16 1 sense that he is reasonably content that work
on narrative in the law not "derive from any arcane extradisciplinary
source," that it be rather "merely the application of logic and common
sense to the work of the storytellers."' 7 More disturbingly, though, when
he comes to his own discussion of narrative in the law, it is all about the
emotional impact of narrative, reiterating what seems to be a common
view of narrative by legal thinkers, that it is a vehicle of emotion, opposed
to logic and reasoning.18 He does not consider that narrative may be a
form of explanation and argument deployed for kinds of meanings that are
time dependent and sequential, that do not lend themselves to other kinds
of statement. One should of course worry about the emotional impact of
stories told at trial-and the law does-but one could learn more about the
components and construction of that impact by way of narratology. Even
more important, one needs to recognize-as Posner I think doesn't-that
narrative is inevitable and irreplaceable: it is not an ornament, it is not
translatable into something else. The argument for study of narrative in the
law must be that it is not reducible to other kinds of speech and argument,
and since it is not, it demands analytic consideration in its own right.' 9
II.
I turn now from these general considerations to a specific instance
in which I find a legal reader, from whatever instinct or training I can't
say, performing a precisely narratological reading of an element of
14. Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 740 (1997) (reviewing LAW'S
STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996)).
15. Id. at 741.
16. See Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Alan M. Dershowitz, Life Is Not
a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra, at 99. I
discuss Dershowitz's argument later in this essay, see infra pp. 25-26; my own introduction briefly
lays out some of the principles of narrative analysis, see Brooks, supra.
17. Posner, supra note 14, at 741.
18. Id. at 744-45.
19. I could go on at greater length on the peculiarities of Posner's review of Law's Stories (while
freely admitting the gaps and inadequacies of the book). His notion of narratologists whose work
should have been included is Wayne Booth, Arthur Danto, and Martha Nussbaum, which excludes
formalist work on narrative in the Russian and French traditions; his notion of "techniques special to
narrative, such as the choice among types of narrator," etc., id. at 741, seems to derive from WAYNE
BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION (1961), an important book but one published before contemporary
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narrative construction, and in doing so making all the difference. The
reader is Justice Potter Stewart, in Bumper v. North Carolina-a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure case from 1968.20 The question to be
decided was whether Hattie Leath consented to a search of her house in
the course of which the police found the rifle putatively used by her
grandson, Wayne Bumper, in a brutal rape and shooting. When the county
sheriff, accompanied by two deputies and a state investigator-all white
males-arrived at the isolated rural home of Hattie Leath-"a 66-year-old
Negro widow"-they claimed to have a warrant to search the house, and
Mrs. Leath reportedly told them, "Go ahead," and opened the door." It
was later ascertained-at a hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence
as illegally obtained-that the sheriff in fact had no warrant.2" At least, no
warrant was returned, and the State did not premise its case on a valid
warrant. The sheriff claimed instead that he relied on Mrs. Leath's consent
to the search. 3 Was her consent, then, an act of free will, or was it coerced
by the false claim of a warrant?
What we know of Mrs. Leath's version of the events, as cited from the
suppression hearing in the opinion of the Court written by Justice Stewart,
reads in part:
Four of them came. I was busy about my work, and they walked
into the house, and one of them walked up and said, "I have a search
warrant to search your house," and I walked out and told them to
come on in. . . . He just come on in and said he had a warrant to
search the house, and he didn't read it to me or nothing. So, I just told
him to come on in and go ahead and search, and I went on about my
work. I wasn't concerned what he was about. I was just satisfied. He
just told me he had a search warrant, but he didn't read it to me. He
did tell me he had a search warrant.
... He said he was the law and had a search warrant to search
the house, why I thought he could go ahead. I believed he had a
search warrant. I took him at his word.... I just see them out there in
the yard. They got through the door when I opened it. At that time, I
did not know my grandson had been charged with crime. Nobody
told me anything. They didn't tell me anything, just picked it up like
that. They didn't tell me nothing about my grandson. 24
Now, the peculiarity of this narrative discourse concerns its source. As
20. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
21. Id. at 546.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 546-47.
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Justice Stewart remarks in an acutely perceptive footnote:
The transcript of the suppression hearing comes to us from North
Carolina in the form of a narrative; i.e., the actual questions and
answers have been rewritten in the form of continuous first person
testimony. The effect is to put into the mouth of the witness some of
the words of the attorneys. In the case of an obviously compliant
witness like Mrs. Leath, the result is a narrative that has the tone of
decisiveness but is shot through with contradictions.25
That is, what appears to be a transcription of Mrs. Leath's narrative of the
events from her point of view is in fact a construction-from the questions
asked and the answers given at the hearing-which makes it appear as if
she is telling the story from beginning to end, and telling it as a story of
consent. But if the words are not in fact hers, but a composite of what was
said to her and the responses elicited from her, then the narrative is an act
of ventriloquism, an example of indirect rather than direct discourse. This
is good fictional technique, as novelists have long understood, but an
obfuscation of the issue of Mrs. Leath's understandings and motivations.
Stewart's assertion that the narrative is "shot through with
contradictions" rests on a certain slippage or incoherence in the relation of
the narrative discourse to the "consent narrative" that the North Carolina
court inferred from it. At another point, for instance, the cited narrative
reads: "Nobody threatened me with anything. Nobody told me they were
going to hurt me if I didn't let them search my house. Nobody told me
they would give me any money if I would let them search. I let them
search, and it was all my own free will." 6
Underneath Mrs. Leath's supposed narrative one hears here the
questions to which she was responding, and in fact many of her sentences
begin with "Yes," or "No," indicating to an attentive reader the latent
presence of a suppressed dialogue. 7 And we come to a realization that
such a phrase as "I let them search, and it was all my own free will" does
not sound like Mrs. Leath's language; it is rather that of the attorneys, who
framed the narrative to be one of freely willed consent. Or at another
moment of the hearing-this not cited by Stewart-she is quoted as
saying: "I thought the search would be valid and there would be no reason
to look at it [the warrant]; that is what I thought about it."'28 This, like the
second citation above, is from the cross-examination of Mrs. Leath by the
State, following her direct examination by the defense, so we can be
certain a word like "valid" is that of the prosecuting attorney, though set
into what is ostensibly her own speech pattern. Once one registers these
25. Id. at 547 n.8.
26. Id.
27. See Joint Appendix at 46-48, Bumper, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (No. 1016).
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dissonances in narrative speech, certain factual uncertainties also emerge.
Did she in fact open the door to them, or did they walk in the door first?
("I was busy about my work, and they walked into the house and one of
them walked up and said . . ."' is one version29; "No, they did not come
into the house before I got to the door; they come to the door. No, they did
not knock because I walked in the door"3 is another, neither wholly
lucid.) Was there any request for consent, or did the sheriff gain entry and
undertake his search on the basis of the claim to authority: "he said he was
the law"? Was there coercion before consent?
The narrative derived from the suppression hearing claims authenticity
and integrity by its mimicry of Mrs. Leath's language, using her
colloquialisms and ungrammaticalities. It pretends to capture her speech
from the outset: "My name is Hattie Leath. I stay on Union Ridge, City
Lake. I stay on Mount Vernon Road, almost a mile off the highway....
This place is just nowhere hardly from City Lake, about 200 yards right
down on the lake."'" It is an example of what literary critics sometimes
call "free indirect discourse" or "narrated monologue,"3 2 here given the
status of direct discourse, quoted monologue, a transcription of what Mrs.
Leath said. But since the narrated monologue is a construction, the attempt
to attribute its narrative of events to Mrs. Leath is a treacherous device that
risks masking her story rather than revealing it. In substituting the
constructed narrative for the questions and answers of the hearing, the
North Carolina transcript elides-and therefore makes us ask-who is
speaking here? It is notable that the dissent in this case, by Justice Hugo
Black, cites and italicizes the key sentence, "I let them search, and it was
all my own free will," and then goes on to claim: "I do not believe the
Court should substitute what it believes Mrs. Leath should have said for
what she actually said-'it was all my own free will."' 33 Black thus
manages to ignore Stewart's footnote, and to take the rewritten narrative
as what Mrs. Leath "actually said." He then goes on to recount what the
majority opinion omits, the story of the rape and shooting, what he calls
the "sordid facts"34 of the case, leading to the conclusion that Bumper is
"obviously guilty. '35 He piles this other horror story-that of the crime
itself-atop the story of the legal/illegal search, in an attempt to trivialize
the fine points of the consent/coercion narrative with the overwhelming
force of the crime narrative. On this basis, Mrs. Leath's consent becomes a
29. Id. at 46.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id. at 45-46.
32. For a good analysis of these terms, see DORRIT COHN, TRANSPARENT MINDS: NARRATIVE
MODES FOR PRESENTING CONSCIOUSNESS (1978).
33. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 556-57 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 558.
35. Id. at 561.
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One may wonder why Stewart makes his crucial point about the
discursive form of the narrative attributed to Mrs. Leath only at the end of
a long footnote, rather than in the body of his argument. I would suggest
that it indicates a certain discomfort with deciding a major constitutional
case on a point of rhetoric, by way of a characterization of a form of
narrative discourse. Judges know that they must often engage in
interpretive work on language, as when they refer to the "canons" that
constrain interpretation of statutes, but they may be uneasy with
suggestions that analyzing the way stories are told makes any difference in
the law. Such a recognition would risk undermining the authority of too
many narratives that the law relies upon-such as the transcript from a
court below. Bumper v. North Carolina leaves me with the very uneasy
question: what if Stewart hadn't noticed? What if something in his training
or sensibility (he was after all the brother of a professor of Classics36 )
hadn't triggered some sense of rhetorical impropriety in the transcript of
the suppression hearing supplied by North Carolina?
While justices can be sensitive readers of narrative accounts, there is
virtually no recognition in Court opinions that there may be a general
problem of narrative, that is, with the forms of telling in which issues are
presented. I note that close to the moment Oliver Wendell Holmes was
initiating the modem spirit in legal thinking, his boyhood friend Henry
James was reflecting on his increasing understanding of the advantages of
perspectivalism in narration, his preference for "a certain indirect and
oblique view of my presented action," especially the uses of someone's
impression of what happens. 7 Nearly any post of observation providing
perspective on what happens is preferable, says James, to "the mere
muffled majesty of irresponsible 'authorship.' 38 "Authorship" is in this
sense irresponsible because no one takes responsibility for how things are
seen and known-to James, of course, a prime preoccupation, especially
in his later work.39 Free indirect discourse or narrated monologue is often
a way to avoid responsibility, as Gustave Flaubert most tellingly
understood: the story appears to "tell itself," more or less in the words and
thoughts of the characters, while there are ironies and juxtapositions that
36. See Harvard Classics Department, Zeph Stewart, The Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the
Humanities, Emeritus, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-classics/people/stewart.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2005) (profiling Professor Zeph Stewart, Potter Stewart's brother).
37. HENRY JAMES, Preface to The Golden Bowl, in LITERARY CRITICISM 1322, 1322 (Leon Edel
& Mark Wilson eds., Library of Am. 1984) (1909).
38. Id. at 1323.
39. Best known of James's work presenting radical issues in point of view may be THE TURN OF
THE SCREW (1898). See also HENRY JAMES, The Beast in the Jungle, in COMPLETE STORIES, 1898-
1910 (John Hollander et al. eds., Library of Am. 1996) (1903); HENRY JAMES, THE SACRED FOUNT
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1901); HENRY JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW (London, W.
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suggest a hidden authorial hand.4" What Stewart has done in Bumper is to
unveil the authorial hand through his close reading. But his reading is an
exceptional and idiosyncratic moment. The Supreme Court does not cite
Henry James's sustained reflection on the means and meaning of different
narrative presentational modes. It does not acknowledge any need for
narrative analysis; it does not register the existence of "narratology."
III.
I offer here some narratological hits and misses in legal decision
making: moments where courts see the importance of how a story has
been told, or else are blind to it. In Bumper, Stewart showed himself a
perceptive reader of a story already constructed in the law. In other cases,
we witness judges constructing stories in ways that may show little
awareness of their narrative premises and implications. Obvious instances
can be found in adjudications of accusations of rape, which pre-eminently
offer competing stories with dramatically different perspectives,
interpretations, and outcomes. Take a well-known case from Baltimore,
State v. Rusk.41 Edward Salvatore Rusk was convicted at trial; the
conviction was reversed in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, then
reinstated in the state's highest court, the Maryland Court of Appeals. In
the decisions on each level of appeal, there were majority and minority
opinions starkly opposed to one another. Thus we have four different
retellings of what we know is the "same" story-the story of what
happened between a man and a woman one night in Baltimore, the story
then constructed at trial-with wholly differing results, results that send
Rusk to prison for seven years or else release him. How can these four
stories, based on the same "facts"- none of the principal events of what
happened that night was in dispute-have different outcomes? The
answer, I think, is that the narrative "glue" is different: the way incidents
and events are made to combine in a meaningful story, one that can be
called "consensual sex" on the one hand or "rape" on the other. The
"facts" take on their meaning only within and by way of a thoroughly
perspectival narrative.42
40. See Flaubert's famous comment: "An author in his book must be like God in the universe,
present everywhere and visible nowhere." Letter from Gustave Flaubert to Louise Colet (Dec. 9,
1852), in THE LETTERS OF GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, 1830-1857, at 173, 173 (Francis Steegmuller trans. &
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1980).
41. State v. Rusk (Rusk II), 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981), rev'g 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1979). 1 have found a brief discussion of some of the narrative elements of these cases in Lisa A.
Binder, "With More Than Admiration He Admired": Images of Beauty and Defilement in Judicial
Narratives of Rape, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 265, 294-98 (1995); and Scheppele, supra note 1, at
2086.
42. Though Henry James never wrote a story of rape, he offers many analogies and metaphorical
versions of violation of personal integrity, perhaps most tellingly, in our context, in JAMES, WHAT
MAISIE KNEW, supra note 39. The classic "literary" treatment of the perspectival stories of rape is of
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The substance of what I call narrative glue-it might be better to think
of the electromagnetic charges given to narrative incidents, which
determine how they will combine and line up-depends in large part on
the judges' view of standard human behavior, on what words and gestures
are held to provoke fear, for instance. Any given narrative will be built to
some extent on what Roland Barthes liked to call doxa, that set of
unexamined cultural beliefs that structure our understanding of everyday
happenings.43 Conversely, those doxa produce stock narratives, ways that
things "are supposed to happen." In Rusk, the judges who rule against the
rape conviction at the two appellate levels tend to construct their
narratives on the basis of how they believe a woman ought to behave in
certain circumstances.
A key moment of the story comes when Rusk, in the passenger seat of
Pat's car, asks her to come up to his apartment; when she refuses, he gets
out of the car, walks to the driver's side window, reaches in and removes
the keys from the ignition, and says: "Now, will you come up?" 4 4 Here
Judge Thompson writes for the mid-level appellate court: "Possession of
the keys by the accused may have deterred her vehicular escape but hardly
a departure seeking help in the rooming house or in the street. '45 One
could go on at some length in analysis of this sentence. "Deterred her
vehicular escape"? A translation would be: Pat is totally stranded in a
deserted street in an unknown and sinister section of downtown Baltimore
in the middle of the night (a translation that is itself of course another
version of events). A phrase such as "vehicular escape" in its very
pompousness should alert us that we are faced with some avoidance
maneuver. And "a departure seeking help" is similarly obscuring: it
translates into something like: running through a deserted street screaming
for help. The sentence is one of many that eschews narrative precision in
favor of an arch rendering of the story from a normative narrative
standpoint which is that of the judge. It is part and parcel of a narrative
point of view in which Pat is always referred to as "the prosecutrix," is
described as "bar hopping, "46 and characterized as "a normal, intelligent,
twenty-one year old, vigorous female. 47 It's a narrative with little
apparent self-awareness on the part of the narrator. He's a bit like Emma
Bovary's husband Charles, in Flaubert's novel: sexually stimulated by the
woman in the story, but not fully capable of understanding her. But his
position of authority makes him less ridiculous than Charles, and more
course the film by Akira Kurosawa, RASHOMON (Daiei Motion Picture Co. 1950).
43. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, From Work to Text, in THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 56, 58 (Richard
Howard trans., Hill & Wang 1986) (1984).
44. Rusk II, 424 A.2d at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Rusk v. State (Rusk 1), 406 A.2d 624, 626 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
46. Id. at 625.
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frightening.
It is on the basis of such a retelling of the story that the first appeals
court reverses Rusk's conviction. In the higher court, the conviction is
reinstated-there are sensitive readers in this case as well-but over the
strong dissent of Judge Cole, who writes, for instance:
She [the victim] may not simply say, "I was really scared," and
thereby transform consent or mere unwillingness into submission by
force. These words do not transform a seducer into a rapist. She must
follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more
than mere words, the violation of her person by a stranger or
unwelcomed friend. She must make it clear that she regards such
sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride.48
What he means is made more specific toward the end of his opinion:
I find it incredible for the majority to conclude that on these
facts, without more, a woman was forced to commit oral sex upon the
defendant and then to engage in vaginal intercourse. In the absence of
any verbal threat to do her grievous bodily harm or the display of any
weapon and threat to use it, I find it difficult to understand how a
victim could participate in these sexual activities and not be willing.
4 9
The details of this plot summary would deserve much closer attention than
I can give here. The one word "participate," for instance, speaks volumes
about Judge Cole's views of sex, especially oral sex, of women, and of the
world. "Participate" in itself conveys a whole conception of a narrative
incident that needs to be unpacked and analyzed.50
On the central issue of fear, Judge Thompson, writing for the majority
of the intermediate appellate court, states that doctrine derived from an
earlier case, Hazel v. State,5' dictates that "the victim's fear that
overcomes her will to resist must be a reasonable fear." 52 This
interpretation may give us pause, since "fear" is rarely an emotion that
behaves reasonably. While Judge Wilner in dissent indicates there is
something wrong with this "rule of reason,"53 it is Chief Judge Murphy,
writing for the higher appellate court, who better articulates the problem:
Hazel did not expressly determine whether the victim's fear must
be "reasonable." Its reference to reasonableness related to whether
"the acts and threats of the defendant were reasonably calculated to
48. Rusk 11, 424 A.2d at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 734.
50. To participate is "to take or have a part or share, as with others." RANDOM HOUSE
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1414 (2d ed. 1993). That is, use of the word "participate" already implies
the conclusion that one has been a part of the action rather than a victim of it.
51. 157 A.2d 922 (Md. 1960).
52. Rusk 1 406 A.2d at 627.
53. Id. at 630 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
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create in the mind of the victim ... a real apprehension, due to fear,
of imminent bodily harm . . ." Manifestly, the Court was there
referring to the calculations of the accused, not to the fear of the
victim. While Hazel made it clear that the victim's fear had to be
genuine, it did not pass upon whether a real but unreasonable fear of
imminent death or serious bodily injury would suffice.54
This strikes me as a fair and useful gloss on the question. It of course
eschews any objective test of whether the victim's fear is reasonably
grounded or not. One may be able to judge whether or not the accused's
words and gestures ought to have caused fear, but whether they did or not
is a matter of the victim's perspective. It seems to me that (in some
version of a rule in tort law55) the putative rapist has to take his victim as
he finds her: her mechanisms of anxiety, fear, panic belong to what
Rousseau long ago called "inner dispositions," and as such tend to evade
external evaluation. 56 Rousseau indeed is something of a theorist of fear as
precisely the emotion that produces unreasonable readings of the world. 7
The differing outcomes in the retellings of the Rusk cases offer a
dramatic instance of how narratives take on design, intention, and
meaning. Narratives do not simply recount happenings; they give them
shape, give them a point, argue their import, proclaim their results. And to
do so they necessarily espouse some sort of "point of view" or
perspective, however hidden it may be, even from narrators themselves.58
The competing stories of Rusk offer an exemplary instance of legal
"narrativity" in that narrative form-while never of course named as
such-is the very bone of contention. The judges in Rusk curiously seem
both to know and not to know this. It is perhaps more useful to say that the
mode in which they know it remains largely untheorized, unarticulated,
and therefore in some large measure unrecognized.
Let me turn to a possibly less obvious instance of judicial narrative
construction, in a case that every first-year American law student knows
by heart, a classic torts case from 1928, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,59 where the Court of Appeals of New York, in a famous opinion by
its Chief Judge, Benjamin Cardozo, reversed the lower court's finding that
54. Rusk II, 424 A.2d at 726-27 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
55. See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.); Vosburg v.
Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
56. On the "inner dispositions," or "innermost feelings" as the most recent translator of the
Confessions puts it, see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, CONFESSIONS 84 (Patrick Coleman ed., Angela
Scholar trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1782).
57. On fear, perception, and language, see 7 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Essay on the Origins of
Language, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 289 (John T. Scott trans. & ed., Univ. Press
of New England 1998) (1781).
58. On "point of view," see COHN, supra note 32; and GtRARD GENETTE, NARRATIVE
DISCOURSE (Jane E. Lewin trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1980).
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the railroad was liable for Helen Palsgraf's injuries. I begin with the "facts
of the case" as stated by Cardozo:
Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad after
buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the
station, bound for another place. Two men ran forward to catch it.
One of the men reached the platform of the car without mishap,
though the train was already moving. The other man, carrying a
package, jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to
fall. A guard on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward
to help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from
behind. In this act, the package was dislodged, and fell upon the rails.
It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches long, and was
covered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fireworks, but there was
nothing in its appearance to give notice of its contents. The fireworks
when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down
some scales at the other end of the platform, many feet away. The
scales struck the plaintiff, causing injuries for which she sues.6"
Legal commentators for decades clucked admiringly over the laconic
clarity of Cardozo's presentation here. More recently, Judge John T.
Noonan has pointed to some of the relevant ancillary facts we don't get
from Cardozo, such as the nature of Helen Palsgraf's injuries, her income
and family status, the financial resources of the Long Island Railroad, the
number of injuries annually resulting from railway accidents, etc.-facts
that would tend to go into a modem torts settlement.61 But what interests
me here is less those other facts than how the admirable concision of
Cardozo's narrative of the accident controls that very narrative, limiting its
reach as a story, keeping it within well-policed boundaries.
Cardozo, like many judges, only appears to tell the story of the event
under adjudication. He recasts the story events so that they make a legal
point, rendering it a narrative recognizable in terms of legal principle. He
wants to demonstrate that the defendant, in the person of the railway
guard, could not reasonably have foreseen the harm to the plaintiff:
The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the
holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff,
standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.
Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it
the potency of peril to persons thus removed.62
The alliteration of this sentence gives it a kind of conclusive panache.
After running through a brisk series of hypothetical narratives intended to
60. Id. at 99.
61. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111-51 (1976).
62. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99.
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show that "prevision so extravagant"63 as to include the remote
consequences of acts cannot be a basis for a ruling in favor of the plaintiff,
Cardozo writes, "Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation., 64 It has
to do with a relation of a legal duty of care and foreseeable harm, which
Cardozo cannot find here. His concise narrative of the incident on the
railway platform is an anti-narrative in that it seeks precisely to destroy
relation, to show that certain linkages of cause and effect are
"extravagant." It works against the kind of connections we usually seek in
narratives.
The eloquent dissent in Palsgraf, by Judge William Andrews, gives a
narrative of the incident even more laconic than Cardozo' S,65 which is
strange since one would think it in Andrews' interest to elaborate on this
story. Instead, Andrews meditates philosophically on kinds of relation
established in stories, and presents us with a series of hypotheticals: a dam
with faulty foundations breaks, injuring property far down stream; a boy
throws a stone into a pond, and "[t]he water level rises. The history of that
pond is altered to all eternity;" "[a] murder at Sarajevo may be the
necessary antecedent to an assassination in London twenty years hence.
An overturned lantern may bum all Chicago. 66 And:
A chauffeur negligently collides with another car which is filled with
dynamite, although he could not know it. An explosion follows. A,
walking on the sidewalk nearby, is killed. B, sitting in a window of a
building opposite, is cut by flying glass. C, likewise sitting in a
window a block away, is similarly injured. And a further illustration:
A nursemaid, ten blocks away, startled by the noise, involuntarily
drops a baby from her arms to the walk. We are told that that C may
not recover while A may. As to B, it is a question for court or jury.
We will all agree that the baby might not.67
In fact, says Andrews, there are no fixed rules to guide us here. "It is all a
question of expediency. '68 The best guide he can offer is: "The court must
ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between
cause and effect."69
How far do the Rube-Goldberg-like consequences of the dynamite-
laden car's explosion extend? Where do you declare the story to be over?
By the term "expediency," Andrews appears to point to the concrete,
particularized, possibly ungeneralizable issues of a single narrative.
Without saying so-and again, without unpacking this particular incident
63. Id. at 100.
64. Id. at 101.
65. Id. at 101-02 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 103.
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on the railway platform-he seems to detect a problem in the doctrine of
"foreseeability" of harm. We recognize harm only after it has occurred,
retrospectively. Narrative itself is retrospective, its meanings become clear
only at the end, and the telling of a story is always structured by
anticipation of that end, the "point" of the story, the moment at which its
sequences and their significance become clear. It is only in hindsight,
retrospectively, that one can establish a "chain of events," in the manner of
Sherlock Holmes concluding one of his cases. "'You reasoned it all out
beautifully,' I exclaimed in unfeigned admiration. 'It is so long a chain,
and yet every link rings true"'-as Dr. Watson admiringly exclaims at the
end of The Red-Headed League.7 ° In this sense, there are no principles to
guide you; there is only the causal and sequential linkage of events, the
concrete particulars which narrative alone can convey.
Now, in neither Cardozo's nor Andrews' narrative of the Palsgraf story
can I find anything about the narrative detail that seems to me most deeply
mysterious and important: those scales which, in Cardozo's account, were
"thrown down" by the shock of the explosion, injuring Helen Palsgraf.
Where and what were these scales? What did they look like? Were they
attached to the wall or freestanding? How did they become dislodged from
their customary position in such a way as to strike Helen Palsgraf? And
how did they strike her, and what kind of injuries did they cause? You
seek in vain, in both the majority and the dissenting opinions, for any
attempt to render this vital moment-the moment of the injury-in the
story. (Torts scholar William Prosser years later decided the scales could
not have been dislodged by the explosion, as claimed by Cardozo, but
were likely knocked down by a panicked crowd-invisible in the two
opinions-on the platform.7 1 ) Any student in Creative Writing 101 would
be sent to rewrite his or her draft for omitting this crucial information. The
very clever student might, of course, in detective story fashion, reserve it
for the end. One can imagine Holmes and Watson in their final wrap-up:
"So those scales, you see ...."
Cardozo once declared in a lecture that "as a system of case law
develops, the sordid controversies of the litigants are the stuff out of which
great and shining truths will ultimately be shaped. '7 2 The statement makes
very clear the rationale for repressing the sordid story of Mrs. Palsgraf on
the railway platform, in order to transform its dross into something
precious, the narrative of the law itself. But surely those great and shining
70. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Red-Headed League, in THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES 49, 73 (Richard Lancelyn Green ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1892). On the retrospective
nature of narrative, see PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT (Harvard Univ. Press reprint ed.
1992) (1984).
71. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 364 (3d ed. 1962), quoted in NOONAN, supra note 61, at 119.
72. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921).
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truths in Palsgraf depend intimately on narrative constructions, on
"sordid" story details, which the opinions in the case repress even as they
recognize their importance. Cardozo and Andrews both recognize that
there is a story to be told, and the dissent, in particular, notices that how it
is constructed makes a difference. But they both then eviscerate the
particular story at hand-indeed they spend more time and give more
particulars in their hypothetical narratives. Their recognition of the
importance of the story is denied by their determination that the story
exists only to reach the "great and shining truths" of legal precedent and
rule. The gesture of the judges here could almost be analogized to classic
scenarios of denial and repression in Freud, such as the child's
simultaneous recognition and repression of sexual difference.73 Here,
recognition of the need to narrate what happened is used to deny any real
narrative-concretely particularized, finely detailed-of what happened.
One could adduce many further examples, of differing kinds, to argue
that an analytic attention to the construction of stories would be a useful
part of the tool kit of legal actors and commentators. Recognition that
narrative is at issue-and that narrative raises issues-would seem to me
essential. "Searches and seizures," for instance, almost inevitably involve
narratives: even the application for a search warrant entails a predictive
narrative of what the search will have uncovered when it has been carried
out. Difficult issues often arise in distinguishing the permissible from the
illegal search. Some recognition on the part of police, judges, and juries of
the distinction between actions and their recounting-their reformulation
as narrative discourse-could be helpful.74 The "facts of the case," once
again, never are neutral or innocent; their telling has a certain narrative
design and intention.
In a different kind of instance, a troubling problematic of narrative has
arisen in the "Victim Impact Statement" (VIS), a relative newcomer to
American law that intends to restore a place to victims of crime who, it
has been argued, are often excluded in our modem adversary process
(since victims no longer bring their own cases, as they did in the medieval
world).75 The VIS gives a detailed account of the harms suffered by the
73. See 19 SIGMUND FREUD, Negation, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 233 (James Strachey ed., Hogarth Press 1961) (1925);
19 SIGMUND FREUD, Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes,
in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra,
at 241 (1925).
74. On some narrative questions raised by searches, see Peter Brooks, "Inevitable Discovery'
Law, Narrative, Retrospectivity, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 71 (2003).
75. On VIS, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361 (1990); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985);
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411 (1993); and Michael Ira Oberlander,
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victim. Is it legitimate to introduce this kind of narrative at the sentencing
phase of a capital case, where its effect is bound to be (and is intended to
be) a harsher penalty, likely death, for the defendant? The U.S. Supreme
Court said no in Booth v. Maryland,76 then four years later reversed itself
(having undergone a significant change in its membership) in Payne v.
Tennessee." The opinions in these cases implicitly argue the question of
whether certain kinds of story-by their nature, tragic, inflammatory, and
irrebuttable-can be told in certain crucial contexts: notably, when a jury
is debating the question of life or death. They raise questions about
narrative relevance (is the trauma of the surviving family members of a
murder victim relevant to the guilt of the defendant?) and narrative closure
(are the sequels to murder, in the sufferings of the survivors, part of the
murder story?). Are VIS the wrong story, meaning: an effective story in
the wrong place?
In Booth, the VIS presents problems similar to those detected by Justice
Stewart in Hattie Leath's testimony in Bumper. The VIS in this instance
was a written statement, prepared by the Maryland Division of Parole and
Probation and read to the jury.7 8 The Appendix to the Supreme Court's
decision gives us the text, detailing the reactions of son, daughter, and
granddaughter to the discovery of the bodies of Irvin and Rose Bronstein,
stabbed to death in the course of a robbery for money to buy drugs.7 9 The
VIS is mainly concerned with the mental states induced in the survivors by
the murder, the consequent depression, fear, sleeplessness, the feeling that
their lives have been permanently changed by this tragedy. Much of the
VIS unfolds in free indirect discourse, in a narrated summary of emotional
affect. For instance, concerning the Bronsteins' daughter:
They didn't have to kill because there was no one to stop them from
looting. Her father would have given them anything. The murders
show the viciousness of the killers' anger. She doesn't feel that the
people who did this could ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't want
them to be able to do this again or put another family through this.
She feels that the lives of her family members will never be the same
80again.
The effectiveness of such a passage-as novelists since Flaubert, at least,
have understood-results from its effacement of any mediating narrator,
its claim to render impersonally, without mediation, the thoughts and
feelings of the individual subject. The anonymous author of the VIS steps
forward only at the end, in a peroration all the more telling in that she has
76. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
77. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
78. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499.
79. Id. at509-15.
80. Id. at 513.
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let the story "tell itself' up to that point:
It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the
family members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still
such a shocking, painful, and devastating memory to them that it
permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that they
will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be
haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved
ones were murdered and taken from them. 81
"It is doubtful that . . .": this phrase makes one want to ask-as Roland
Barthes does of some narrative statements in Balzac-"who is
speaking? '82 Who is responsible for this narrative discourse and the
judgments it conveys? In the absence of an author, the phrase tends to
become the reader's, a judgment internalized.83 The conclusion reached by
this anonymous employee of the Department of Parole and Probation
appeals to an impersonal, and therefore irrefutable, construction, one
devoid of specific human agency, endowed with all the power of the doxa,
the truth invested with general societal authority.
Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion in Booth, does not
perform the act of narrative analysis offered by Stewart in Bumper. But he
cites the VIS in its entirety in his appendix, noting that "the family
members were articulate and persuasive in expressing their grief and the
extent of their lOSS.''84 We can take this as a kind of indirect and perhaps
troubled accolade to the author of the VIS, whose hidden presence is not
explicitly remarked upon by Powell. When the Court reverses in Payne,
Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to delectate in his narrative authority,
telling the story of Tyrone Pervis Payne's mayhem with a kitchen knife in
all its gory detail.85 He opens his opinion with the "horrifying scene"
inside the apartment, where Charisse Christopher has received eighty-four
separate knife wounds.86 She and her daughter are both dead; her son
survives only after seven hours of surgery. 87 No part of Rehnquist's horror
story is strictly relevant to the issue of VIS, since it is information the jury
would have received during the guilt phase of the trial, not in a statement
at the sentencing phase. But his attitude seems to be one of: now we are
free to tell our stories of the impact of crimes without restraint. It is an odd
performance, but one that seems to demonstrate some semi-conscious
81. Booth, 482U.S. at515.
82. See ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z 139-40, 151-52 (Richard Miller trans., Hill & Wang 1974)
(1970).
83. According to Barthes, certain "equivocations" of the narrative text stand for the reader's
interest in its interpretation, his or her participation as decoder of the text. See id. at 151-52.
84. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
85. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 812-13 (1991).
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awareness of the potency of narrative unleashed.
IV.
Trial lawyers, as Burns knows, as indeed we all know, are aware that
they need to tell stories, that the evidence they present in court must be
bound together and unfolded in narrative form. 8 Presumably legal
advocates have known this for millennia, since the discipline of rhetoric,
including argumentation through narrative, was in antiquity primarily
training for making one's case in a court of law. Rhetoric was an
encompassing system for making and interpreting arguments. 89
Narratology properly belongs to the analytic branch of rhetoric, to the
operations by which one takes apart and studies an utterance or text. But
the professionalization of law and legal education has over time tended to
obscure the rhetorical roots of legal practice. In fact, the close ties law
once entertained with rhetoric might now be viewed as something of a
scandal in a field that wants to believe that it is rooted in irrefutable
principles and that it proceeds by its own special methodology: modes of
legal interpretation that do not necessarily produce unanimous results but
nonetheless--excepting a few dissenting law professors-form a generally
accepted discourse. It is part and parcel of its professionalization that legal
discourse wishes to see itself as complete, autonomous, and hermetic.90 To
the extent that it may call upon kinds of expertise and analysis foreign to
itself, it will make them pass through the narrow gate watched over by the
judge-at trial, and then at the appellate level-who is supposed to know
the judicial from the extra-judicial.
This gate-keeping function may in fact characterize law's way of
acknowledging its narrative entanglements: it recognizes them through its
attempts to police narrative form and content. The law tends to limit and
formalize conditions of telling and listening, as if from a suspicion of the
force of narratives. In modern judicial procedure, stories rarely are told
directly, uninterruptedly. At trial, they are elicited piecemeal by attorneys
intent to shape them to the rules of evidence and procedure, then
reformulated in persuasive rhetoric to the listening jurors. The fragmented,
contradictious, murky unfolding of narrative in the courtroom is subject to
formulae by which the law attempts to impose rule on story, to limit its
free play and extent. Should Nicole Simpson's 911 phone call be
88. See, e.g., LUBET,supra note 2, at 1-4, 8-14.
89. By "rhetoric," I understand the art of persuasion-all that is deployed in discourse to make an
argument and produce assent in a listener or reader-and, by extension, the whole communicative
system of discourse. For an engaging discussion of rhetoric in this sense, see Roland Barthes, The
Old Rhetoric: An Aide-M~moire, in THE SEMIOTIC CHALLENGE II (Richard Howard trans., 1988).
90. Similar points about the professional autonomy desired by the law have been made by Stanley
Fish. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 294 (1989).
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considered part of the story of her murder?9" Or is that part of another
story, which, brought within the sequence ending in homicide, takes on a
misleading significance and force? All the rules of evidence-including
the notorious "exclusionary rule"-touch on the issue of rule-governed
storytelling. The judge must know and enforce these rules. And when
stories are culled from the trial record and retold on the appellate level, it
is in order to evaluate their conformity to the rules. Appellate courts are
not supposed to second-guess the "triers of fact" in the case, but to judge
the frameworks in which the verdict was reached. At this level, all
narratives become exemplary: they illustrate a point of law, a crucial issue
in justice, a symbolic moment in the relations of individual and state. So it
is that the law has found certain kinds of narrative problematic, and has
worried about whether or not they should have been allowed a place at
trial-or what place they should have been allowed. Yet the law's
recognition of its repressed narrative content and form generally comes in
a negative manner, as denial. The bar of repression keeps the narrativity of
the law under erasure.
There is one instance-to the best of my knowledge, the only one-in
which the Supreme Court overtly recognizes what one might call the legal
stakes of narrative in adjudication. In Old Chief v. United States, decided
in 1997, the question at issue was whether a defendant with a prior
conviction on his record should be allowed to "stipulate" to the prior
conviction, thus disallowing the prosecution from presenting the facts of
the earlier felony in making the case against him for his new alleged
crime.92 Defendant Johnny Lynn Old Chief knew he had to admit to a
prior crime and conviction-on an assault charge-but didn't want the
prosecutor to be able to detail the prior crime, for fear that it would
aggravate his sentence on the new crime (which in fact was quite similar
to the prior one). The prosecutor refused to accept the stipulation, and the
district court judge ruled in his favor: the full story of the prior crime and
conviction was offered as evidence.93 Old Chief was found guilty on all
counts of the new charges of assault, possession, and violence with a
firearm. He appealed. His conviction was upheld by the Ninth Circuit,
which essentially restated the traditional position that the prosecution is
free to make its case as it sees fit.94 When the case reached the Supreme
91. Including Nicole Simpson's 911 phone call implies that it constitutes a significant part of a
narrative whose shape and significance is largely determined by how it ended: in her murder.
Excluding it argues that the spousal abuse that resulted in the 911 call has nothing to do with the later
homicide. Whether or not to allow the 911 call thus depends to some degree on where you take up
your stand as interpreter of the narrative: at the end of a story known to be one of homicide, or at the
beginning of a story yet to be determined.
92. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
93. Id. at 176.
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Court, Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, endorsed that traditional
position. 95
But this claim was rejected by the majority (consisting of Justices
Souter, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer) in an opinion written by
Souter that argues that introduction of the full story of the past crime could
be unfairly prejudicial; it could lead the jury to convict on grounds of the
defendant's "bad character," rather than on the specific facts of the new
crime. 96 The story of the past crime might "lure the factfinder into
declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged." 97 The story of the past crime must be excluded, not because it is
irrelevant, but because it may appear over-relevant: "it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge."98 The story of Old Chief's past crime must be excluded
because it risks creating too many narrative connections between past and
present. It risks establishing a powerful perspective that ends up creating
that inference-one we regularly derive from narratives-that goes under
the name "character," hence authorizing the jury to convict on the basis of
"bad character" rather than the specifics of the present story.
Justice Souter in this manner orders the exclusion of the past story,
reverses Old Chief's conviction, and remands the case for further
proceedings.99 But the most interesting moment of his opinion comes in
his discussion of the dissenters' point of view, their argument that the
prosecution needs to be able to present all the evidence, including the
story of past crime and conviction, in its specificity. He concedes the need
for "evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case."' 00
He goes on to say that "making a case with testimony and tangible things.
tells a colorful story with descriptive richness."1 0' And he continues:
Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and
as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with power
not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of
jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to
reach an honest verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and
particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the
obligations that the law places on them.1"2
95. Old Chief 519 U.S. at 192-201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 180, 185.
97. Id. at 180.
98. Id. at 181.
99. Id. at 173.
100. Id. at 183.
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It is almost as if Souter had been reading literary narratology, and been
persuaded by the argument that narrative is a different kind of
organization and presentation of experience, a different kind of "language"
for speaking the world.1 °3 In the conclusion to this section of his opinion,
he writes:
A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom
may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove
it. People who hear stories interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be
puzzled at the missing chapters .... A convincing tale can be told
with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the natural
sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing link is
really there is never more than second best. 1
04
Here, Souter turns back to the case of Old Chief, to argue that the
prosecution's claim of the need to tell the story of the earlier crime is
unwarranted because it is another story; it is "entirely outside the natural
sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to
commit the current offense."'0 5 Old Chief's stipulation does not result in a
"gap" in the story, it does not displace "a chapter from a continuous
sequence."10
6
Souter hence rules out the prosecution's longer, fuller narrative as the
wrong story, something that should not be part of the present narrative
sequence. It is interesting that in so doing he feels the need to speak at
some length of the place and power of narrative in the presentation of
legal evidence: its "richness," its "momentum," its "persuasive power." 107
"A syllogism is not a story": in this phrase, Souter appears to recognize
what a few scholars within and without the legal academy have argued,
that the law's general assumption that it solves cases with legal tools of
reason and analysis that have no need for a narrative analysis could be
mistaken. Souter thus breeches the bar over what you might call an
element of the repressed unconscious of the law, bringing to light a
narrative content and form that traditionally go unrecognized. Yet
curiously, or perhaps predictably, he does it by way of an argument that in
103. See Bruner, supra note 11.
104. 519 U.S. at 189. Filmmaker Errol Morris has recently made a similar argument about the
fatal flaw of John Kerry's presidential campaign: that he excised his opposition to the Vietnam War
from his biography.
That was a mistake. People think in narratives-in beginnings, middles and ends. The danger
when you edit something too severely is that it no longer makes sense; worse still, it leaves
people with the disquieting impression that something is being hidden.
... [H]e left a blank space in his personal story ....
Errol Morris, Op-Ed., Where's the Rest of Him?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A2 1.
105. 519 U.S. at 191.
106. Id.
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the present case the lower courts failed to guard against the irrelevant and
illegitimate power of narrative, admitting into evidence story elements-
the story of Old Chief's prior crime-that should not be considered part of
the "natural sequence" of the present crime. The past story would give too
much credence to the present story that the prosecution must prove. It is in
defending against the power of storytelling that Souter admits its force.
And his riff on narrative has not been cited in any subsequent Supreme
Court opinions.'0 8
Could one say that law needs a narratology? What would be its
elements? All the most helpful narrative analysis since Aristotle has
addressed the shape of narrative-beginnings, middles, and ends-in
relation to the meanings it creates.'0 9 Narrative plots appear to be a certain
formal organization of temporality, and need to be seen in their structuring
cognitive role: a way of making sense of time-bound experience.
Narratology, I noted earlier, includes attention to minimal units of
narrative and how they combine in a plot; to how we understand the
initiation and completion of an action; to standard narrative sequences
(stock stories); to the movement of a narrative though a state of
disequilibrium to a final outcome that re-establishes order. 110 Narratology
also considers perspectives of telling: who sees and who tells; the explicit
or implicit relation of the teller to what is told; the varying temporal
modalities between the told and its telling."'
Most important, perhaps, narratology postulates a fundamental
distinction between events in the world and the ways in which they are
presented in a narrative discourse, demonstrating that storytelling always
attempts to give some shape and significance to life. Russian Formalists
made a basic distinction between fabula (the order of events as they took
place in the world referred to by the narrative discourse) and sjuzhet (the
order and manner in which the events are represented in the narrative
discourse)."12 This distinction allows us to reflect on the many ways in
which our tellings reorganize events to give them a certain inflection and
108. It has, however, received some attention in other federal and in some state courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Merino-Balderamma, 146
F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Requaz, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998); State v.
Alexander, 571 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1997). Also see the "rule of narrative completeness" derived from
Old Chief in State v. Monceaux, 885 So. 2d 670, 676 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
109. The briefest list of sources here would include ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in INTRODUCTION TO
ARISTOTLE 661 (Richard McKeon ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1973); ROLAND BARTHES, Introduction to
the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in A BARTHES READER (Susan Sontag ed., Richard Howard
trans., Hill & Wang 1982) (1966); BARTHES, supra note 82; BROOKS, supra note 70; GENETTE, supra
note 58; GERALD PRINCE, NARRATOLOGY (Mouton 1982) (1972); RUSSIAN FORMALIST CRITICISM
(Lee T. Lemon & Marion Reis eds. & trans., Univ. of Neb. Press 1965); and TZVETAN TODOROV, THE
POETICS OF PROSE (Richard Howard trans., Comell Univ. Press 1977) (1971).
110. See BARTHES, supra note 109; TODOROV, supra note 109.
111. See GENErrE, supra note 58.
112. See READINGS IN RUSSIAN POETICS (Ladislav Matejka & Krystyna Pomorska eds., 1971);
RUSSIAN FORMALIST CRITICISM, supra note 109.
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intention, a point, and a particular effect on their hearers. The distinction
leads to a further insight: often we as listeners or readers know "what
happened" in the world only through its tellings. We are always
summoned to consider the possible omissions, distortions, rearrangements,
moralizations, rationalizations that belong to any recounting. The more we
study modalities of narrative presentation, the more we may be made
aware of how narrative discourse is never innocent but always
presentational and perspectival, a way of working on story events that is
also a way of working on the listener or reader. In sum, narratology helps
us to understand the reach of narrativity in human consciousness, but also
to "denaturalize" narratives, to show their constructedness, how they are
put together and what we can learn from taking them apart.' 13
This sketch of elements is much too brief, of course; fleshing it out
would demand a separate paper (or book) but would be entirely feasible. A
legal narratology might be especially interested in narrative transactions,
in questions of narrative transmission and decoding: that is, stories in the
situation of their telling and listening, asking not only how these stories
are constructed and told, but also how they are listened to, received,
reacted to, how they ask to be acted upon and how they in fact become
operative. What matters most, in the law, is how the "narratees" or
listeners-juries, judges-hear and construct the story. As I noted earlier,
people go to prison, even to execution, because of the well-formedness
and force of the winning story. "Conviction"-in the legal sense-results
from the conviction created in those who judge the story. So it is that a
greater attention to the narrative forms given to the law might promote
greater clarity about what it is that achieves conviction. Legal actors may
well claim that they are already commonsensically aware of narrative
forms at work in the law. Nonetheless, they might benefit from a
recognized perceptual and analytic grid for identifying, and exchanging
understandings about, the uses and effects of narrative constructions in the
law. The ability to analyze narrative as narrative-to take it apart and put
it back together in the manner of the narratologist-could be of clear
benefit to those who have to make legal sense of "what happened."
Yet this plea for a formal, analytic attention to narrative in the law
meets an objection that has been flamboyantly presented by Alan
Dershowitz. Dershowitz contends that the whole notion of a well-formed
narrative-as exemplified in Chekhov's "rule" that a gun introduced in act
one of the drama must by act three be used to shoot someone-is
misleading in the court of law, since it leads jurors to believe that real-life
stories must obey the same rules of coherence.' 14 If we allow into evidence
113. See BROOKS, supra note 70; Bruner, supra note 11.
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the narrative of spousal abuse, then the eventual murder of former wife by
former husband becomes a logical narrative conclusion to the story.
Whereas, Dershowitz wants to argue, who's to say that life really provides
such a narrative logic? Dershowitz offers here his version of a theory of
narrative advanced by, among others, Jean-Paul Sartre, in his contention
that telling-as opposed to living-really starts at the end of the story,
which is there from the beginning, transforming events into indicia of their
finality, their making sense in terms of their outcome. 5
It is indeed in the logic of narrative to show, by way of the sequence and
enchainment of events, how we got to where we are. As I suggested in
discussing Palsgraf narrative understanding is retrospective. Dershowitz
may be right to protest that life is blinder and more formless than that. His
dissent from the narrative ordering of reality usefully alerts us to how
stories may manipulate us. And yet, his protest may be largely in vain,
since the narrative construction of reality is inescapable. Our literary sense
of how stories go together-their beginnings, middles, and ends-may in
fact govern life as well as literature more than he is willing to allow. Our
very definition as human beings is very much bound up with the stories
we tell, about our own lives and the world in which we live. The
imposition of narrative form on life is a necessary human activity; we
could not make sense of the world without it. We seek to understand
actions as intelligible units that combine into goal-oriented plots. Hence, if
Dershowitz utters a significant caveat about putting too much trust in a
preformed sense of how stories "turn out," it's not clear that we could
even put together a story, or construe a story as meaningful, without this
competence-acquired very early in life-in narrative construction. If
narrative form were to be entirely banished from the jury's consideration,
there could be no more verdicts. The best we can hope for is a more
critical awareness of the storied nature of our thinking, as well as of the
material presented to our thought.
Thinking about the place of narrative in American law must also and
perhaps finally pay attention to the fact that issues of telling and
listening-like all other issues-find their ultimate commentary in the
judicial opinion, especially the Supreme Court opinion. "It is so ordered,"
the opinion of the Court typically concludes, letting us understand that the
Court has delivered a narrative of order, one that itself imposes order, and,
more generally, that narrative orders, gives events a definitive shape and
meaning. "It is so ordered": this rhetorical topos inevitably fascinates the
literary analyst, who normally deals with texts that cannot call on such
authority. (Much literature, one suspects, would like to be able to conclude
115. See id. at 101; see also BROOKS, supra note 70; FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN
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with such a line-to order an attention to its message, to institute a new
order or a new point of view on the basis of the imaginative vision it has
elaborated.) The court, in so ordering, must activate conviction that its
narrative is the true and the right one. Recall the forceful statement on this
point in the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,1 6 the case that reaffirmed, in broad outline,
the right to abortion first secured in Roe v. Wade." 7 The joint opinion,
arguing the importance of stare decisis and the respect for precedent,
notes: "Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent
succession."1 18 The "covenant," we might say, is a master narrative, into
which each new narrative episode must be fitted. How does this work? In
the words of the joint opinion, "the Court's legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled
character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation."'119 The
narrative of the covenant relies on precedent and stare decisis in order that
change or innovation appear to be principled, so that sequence appear not
random but an instance of consecution. The most apt words in the
sentence quoted may be "sufficiently plausible." What does suffice here?
Only that which is rhetorically effective, that which persuades, that which
assures "conviction." "Sufficiently plausible" invites assent, but also a
degree of awareness of how one is being worked on by rhetoric.
"Sufficiently plausible" is a tautology that points to the inevitable
hermeneutic circle of narrative interpretation.
The rhetoric of the Casey joint opinion (which has become a kind of
dartboard for Justice Scalia's poisoned barbs12°) could also be seen as a
form of apologia for that "mere muffled majesty of irresponsible
'authorship"' rejected by Henry James.'21 "Authorship" of Supreme Court
opinions is by tradition invested with muffled majesty, indeed their very
authority depends on a rhetoric of continuity and steadfastness through the
ages, so that the Court may claim an institutional immortality transcending
its present membership. When dissenting opinions take issue with the
rhetoric of authority, attempt to show it as illegitimate, overreaching, a
misreading of the Court's own past statements, a fissure in the covenantal
discourse may be opened. Whether this will make any real difference in
the ongoing narrative of Constitutional interpretation can only be known
through subsequent decisions that rewrite the story. When the Court
116. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
117. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
118. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
119. Id. at 866.
120. See in particular his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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reverses itself, there is of course a moment of narrative peripeteia, a
reversal that forces a re-reading, an anagnorisis or recognition that makes
the past bathe in a different light-or else makes the new-found ending
seem illegitimate.
No one, I suspect, wants to abolish the muffled majesty of Supreme
Court rhetoric. It makes us sleep better at night, and when it is seriously
violated-as in Bush v. Gore-we suffer.'22 But I do want to urge that
some attention to the "narrativity" of the law-the narrative transactions
performed within the law--could begin to open to thought some of the
unthought assumptions, procedures, and language of the law. If, as Souter
puts it in Old Chief a syllogism is not a story, the law needs to become
more conscious of its storytelling functions and procedures. If stories are
generally told from a point of view, for a purpose, and create a perspective
on happenings-even create happenings through perspective-then it
would seem that some borrowings from literary analysis and theory could
be useful. The "law and literature" movement has been less effective than
it might be, I think, because it has, with excessive arrogance or excessive
humility (or often some combination of both), proposed a relation to the
law ranging from the deconstructive (possible certainly, but largely
useless) to the feel good (literature as a cozy humanizing teddy bear for
law to curl up with). What it might better do, I believe, is demonstrate to
legal studies that it has analytic instruments in its toolkit that might
actually be of some use with the legal plumbing.
122. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The acrimonious and overtly political split of this case tended to cast
discredit on the notion of the Court as elevated above politics, making decisions on purely legal
grounds, as Justice Breyer most openly stated in his dissent. See id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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